mining basic systemic issues, i.e. those referring to arrangement, organization of the state in political and socioeconomic concept, observance of high requirements as to satisfying legislation constitutes a challenge of the crucial importance also for the quality of functioning of public authorities. In addition, placement in binding Basic Law of a wide array of rights and freedoms of humans and citizens shape legal situation of an individual also within the scope of means of protection of rights and freedoms, i.e. procedures and institutions possible to be launched in case of infringements in that DOI: 10.2478/lape-2019-0003
A b s t r a c t
Indication of conditions constituting necessity of modifications within the scope of the Constitution shall be considered while perceiving the leading role of the Constitution in Polish legal order. Constitutional regulations determine standards for the entire legal system of the Republic of Poland. It is also worth a while to consider the need for unambiguous determination of relations of constitutional norms, also with regard to the law of the European Union. Doubts appearing within the scope of systemic rules concern mainly regulations specifying the rule of division and balancing of powers. Actually, they consist in lacks with regard to organization of bodies of each of three powers. Another issue is improvement of solutions determining coexistence of government and local government administration within the broader scope of principles of uniformity of the state and decentralization of public power. The article presents an analysis related to the aforementioned issues.
regard. The role of constitutional norms, emphasized hereinabove, generates the necessity of deepened systemic reflection, both in institutional, as well as in individual regard, contributing to creation, on the basis of the Constitution, of solutions effectively safeguarding efficient functioning of the state and optimizing rights and freedoms of citizens. However, before remarks concerning the above-mentioned issues are made, it is indispensable to consider constitutional conditions concerning the hierarchy of sources of generally binding law. In article 87 of the Constitution, the catalogue of these sources is determined, comprising the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements, regulations and acts of local law. In addition, in article 234 of the Constitution, regulations with the legal force of a statute are invoked as acts possible to be issued during the state of war, when the Seym cannot be gathered for a meeting 2 . Apart from making a full list of sources of generally binding law, chosen constitutional norms, as a rule, specifically regulate also hierarchical relations occurring in between. Doubts within that regard may arise solely in case of the juxtaposition of Polish Constitution and the European Union law, which is per se a problem of great significance. Primacy of the European Union law with regard to Polish subconstitutional acts, starting from statutes, results basically from article 91 section 3 of the Constitution where it is clearly stated that the law enacted by an international organization in case when the Republic of Poland has ratified the agreement founding that organization, is directly applicable 3 , taking precedence in case of conflict with statutes. Consequently, the legislator allows for systemic coexistence of the law enacted by the national legislator with the law remaining outside of the scope of the legislator in question. Such a construction of legal sources is also in conformity with the rule of observance of binding international law by Poland, comprised by article 9 of the Constitution, which nevertheless as to its interpreta-2 For detailed characteristics of such acts, vide B. Opaliński, Rozporządzenie z mocą ustawy w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, "Państwo i Prawo" 2012 . The author indicates that the wording of constitutional provisions indicate that the President is obliged to issue such regulations if only the Council of Ministers submits a proper motion in that regard.
3 More about ramifications of such wording of article 91 section 1 of the Constitution L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2011 , p. 143, as well as B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Warszawa 2009 tion and application should not be treated in competitive categories with regard to domestic norms. To the contrary, if international regulations may function in Polish legal order solely upon the consent of public authorities of the Republic, which embodies the principle of sovereignty of the state, determined in an array of constitutional provisions (article 5, article 26 section 1, article 104 section 2, article 126 section 2, article 130), the conclusion drawn in the preceding sentence (in fine) seems to be indisputable. However, the sovereignty does not mean lack of possibility of limited transfer of competences by the Republic of Poland to an international body or organization, by virtue of an international convention (article 90 section 1 of the Constitution) which, however, on the basis of the Constitution is secured with several guaranteeing solutions (article 90 section 2-4 of the Constitution). In that context, an opinion of K. Wojtyczek may be invoked, stating that sovereignty of the state should at present be deemed not as the exclusivity of competences of the state to decide on its matters, but more as a presumption of such competence for the state and the right to decide on rebuttal of such presumption within a given scope 4 .
Linguistic interpretation of article 8 section 1 of the Basic Law allows for the assumption that the Constitution is the supreme law originating from the Republic of Poland, which can give a field for interpretation whether constitutional norms are the supreme law binding in the state. In such case, inactivity resulting from political conflicts or simply intellectual deficiencies, focusing on conviction about lack of existence of the problem, or maybe possibility to put it off up to not clearly determined future may generate processes disadvantageous with regard to the sovereignty of the state. It is symptomatic that after the failure of the project 'Constitution for Europe' within which the statement about primacy of the European Union law was forced, in the Treaty of Lisbon 5 no such solutions were intended. Consequently, at present in the Treaties there are no references to the primacy of the European Union law. There is the declaration no. 17, enclosed to the Treaty of Lisbon and indicating the primacy in question with reference to jurisprudence of the Court of Justice -but that declaration, as an act of political character, is not legally binding, although it certainly constitutes a guideline for interpretation 6 . In judgments of Polish Constitutional Tribunal there may be found decrees underlining the systemic weigh of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, due to which a conflict between its norms and the European Union legal order may not be resolved by simple assumption of primacy of the law of the European Union 7 . Legal certainty 8 , derived at the level of Polish law from the principle of democratic legal state, but present also at the level of the European Union primary law, justifies the need of unambiguous constitutional stipulations determining the primacy of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland also with regard to international legal regulations that are binding for Poland.
Certain constitutional systemic norms may be considered as solutions that are standard for systems of other democratic states. One of rules which is meant to ensure the efficiency of functioning of public authorities is the rule of division and balance of powers 9 . At the general normative level, that regulation does not raise doubts. It pertains to, on the one hand, division of imperious powers, which is to ensure lack of possibility of illegal infringement of the systemic order in the state, and on the other hand, balanced relations between bodies of specific powers. Accuracy from the side of the legislator is desired so as to create a possibility to amortize interinstitutional conflicts, resulting from political fight led on a current basis. These, very general in their shape, assumptions, should be specified within the scope of detailed concretizing norms. 6 So majority of the doctrine, including A. Kuś, Konstytucyjność Traktatu z Lizbony (in:) Aktualne problemy konstytucyjne w świetle wniosków, pytań prawnych i skarg konstytucyjnych do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, P. Daniluk, P. Radziewicz (eds.), Warszawa 2010, p. 661-662; different view of G. Beck, European Law Journal 2011, no. 4, p. 471-472. 7 In particular wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 11 maja 2005, K 18/04, OTK-A 2005, nr 5, pozycja 49. 8 For detailed characteristics of that rule, vide D. Cendrowicz, Pewność prawa w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, "Administracja: teoria, dydaktyka, praktyka" 2012, no. 3, p. 29-54. 9 For detailed characteristics of that rule, vide P. Wiśniewski, Zasada podziału i równowagi władz w polskim prawic konstytucyjnym w ujęciu historycznym i w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., "Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL" 2009, no. 1, p. 181-203.
The Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and The Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in which there is no Praetor,
Comparison of competences of the Seym and the Senate in systemic, legislative, creational and control facets does not leave any doubts as to the dominating position of the Seym. It is the Seym which is authorized to enact bills (article 120 of the Constitution) and participation of the Senate in the legislative process consists in limited, with regard to time, possibility of taking the standpoint which is not binding for the Seym (article 121 of the Constitution). Equalization of competences of the Seym and the Senate in legislative process concerns only amendment of the Constitution (article 235 section 4 of the Constitution -the systemic competence) and expression, in the form of a statute, a consent to transfer of competences of bodies of Polish state (article 80 section 2 of the Constitution). The exclusive domain of the Seym constitutes also function of control directed to the Council of Ministers (article 95 section 2 of the Constitution) within which the Senate is actually deprived of formal rights. In turn, creational function, consisting in decisions as to personal composition of public power bodies, in its significant part belongs to the Seym, with competences of the Senate heavily restricted.
Thus, it is relatively easy to indicate that historically right reactivation of the Senate within the framework of systemic changes in Poland was not properly supplemented by a mature reflection with regard to the sphere of competences of the body in question. In the past, it gave rise even to formulation of views about the need to remove the Senate. Although today such voices appear only rarely, it seems that there are political, not material conditions which are decisive here. Creation of a given body should be accompanied by further reflection, comprising the sphere of its rights as both too limited competences (as in case of the Senate), as well as competences crossing competences of other entities do not favor quality, both in enacting and applying the law.
Differentiation, in Polish systemic order, of the Council of Minister and the President as elements of executive power of two components entails the necessity to make valuations referring to formal and practical dimension of rule. The President of the Republic of Poland, as a person originating from general elections (article 127 section 1 of the Constitution), has a strong mandate within that scope. In addition, the content of article 126 section 1 and 2 of the Constitution suggests an important systemic placement of the head of the state, inter alia as the highest representative of the Republic of Poland, the guarantor of continuity of public power or guardian of the Constitution, as well as sovereignty and security of the state. The norms indicated in the preceding sentence do not, however, have directly empowering character, due to their general character and clear reference to specific competences in article 126 section 3 of the Constitution, outside of article 126. Moreover, an attempt to associate with content in article 126 the empowering dimension might amount to recognition of omnipotence of the President with regard to other public power bodies, even only due to the stipulation that the head of the state is its highest representative. Indeed, a part of wording of article 126 section 1 and 2 of the Constitution may be specified in a relatively easy manner, for instance that about keeping watch and ward observance of the Constitution in the context of presidential rights to initiate procedures of examination of conformity of acts with the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the remaining stipulations give rise to at least interpretational ambiguities that may at least partially refer to competences of the President within the scope of foreign affairs and defense policies. Specifying, on the basis of article 133 section 1 of the Constitution, the President while representing Polish state in external relations is authorized to: -ratify and terminate international treaties with a duty to notify the Seym and the Senate thereof, -appoint and dismiss Polish representatives in other states and international organizations, -accept authorizing letters and letters dismissing diplomatic representatives of other states and international organizations, that are accredited to the President. The manner of construction of the provision invoked hereinabove excludes acceptance of broad interpretation with regard thereto, also due to the rule of legality (article 7 of the Constitution) by virtue of which public power bodies should act on the basis and within the borders imposed by the law. Also the Constitutional Tribunal in its rulings adopted preference of interpretation of provisions granting competences on the basis of linguistic interpretation, rejecting competence presumptions within the scope not directly specified in the content of a given provision, for instance on the basis of teleological interpretation. As the Tribunal assessed, in case when legal norms do not directly create competences of the state body, such competence should not be inferred on the basis of a right that is different in kind, since it leads to attribution to the legislator of an intent it did not express.
Noticeable scantiness of presidential competences in the sphere of foreign policy is even more limited by the requirement (article 133 section 3 of the Constitution) of cooperation of the President within that sphere with the Prime Minister and competent minister, whereas no reciprocal regulations exist within that scope.
Going back to the substance of article 133 section 1 of the Constitution and analyzing it in the context of more specific subconstitutional relations, such as the Act on divisions of governmental administration 10 , the Act on the Council of Ministers 11 , the Act on international agreements 12 or the Act on foreign service 13 , attention should be drawn to formal, to a significant extent, or requiring strict arrangements with the Council of Ministers, character of competences of the head of the state. Therefore, the question of inadequacy of power of mandate of the President to rule, derived directly from the sovereign, with the area of presidential external rights, returns. It should be deemed that the remedy for such situation is the necessity to embody, within the Basic Law, one of two solutions:
-the solution within which the President has basically representative rights, not being elected in general elections, -the solution within which the President, elected by the nation, has significantly extended position as to competences -which means considerable modifications in its relations with the government hitherto prevailing. Limited rights of the President in international relations may contribute also to diminution of its position during contacts with foreign partners who certainly are aware of lack of consequence with regard to proper empowerment of the head of Polish state within the scope of foreign policy. Such situation constitutes also a possible controversial element in relations of the President with the government, even in case when these centers originate from the same political camp.
Connections between legislative vices in creation of the described position of the President when juxtaposed to the principle of democratic legal state (article 2 of the Constitution) and the aforementioned division and balance of powers, are not indifferent also. The Constitutional Tribunal has derived an array of specific legal principles from the first of these principles, pertaining to a significant extent to proper legislation 14 . Such practice may rise doubts as exceeding the status of the body applying the law -but is aimed not only at subconstitutional acts, but may also be used in case of amendment of the Basic Law. It should be used mainly when standards determined by the Constitutional Tribunal exceed intentions of persons preparing amendments to the Constitution. The requirement of decent legislation, from the point of view of the Tribunal, encompasses the need of definiteness (comprehensibility) of provisions, i.e. formulation of their substance in a clear and precise manner under the pain of possible reproach of infringement of the principle of democratic legal state. As article 2 of the Constitution does not have privileged position with regard to other constitutional norms, that jurisprudential thesis has a directional value, not directly normative one. The Constitutional Tribunal indicated also the rules of legislative technique as the model to be taken into account in democratic legal state. Therefore, language of provisions should be comprehensible for addressees, reflect intentions of the legislator, and consequently, be precise and communicative. Material content of rulings should constitute a significant premise in case of verification of rights of the President with regard to foreign policy.
The second of spheres of presidential rights outlined in the Constitution concerns the defense. The President is the highest superior of the armed forces, whereas the dominion in question is performed during peace through the intermediation of the Minister of National Defence who, as the member of the Council of Ministers, possesses real competences within the scope of civil control over the army. Apart from representative dimension of the dominion of the head of the state, the President has, in light of the Constitution, the sphere of real creational rights (article 134 section 3-5 of the Constitution) and chosen other ones (article 136, article 116 section 2, article 229, article 230 of the Constitution), although their exercise as a rule requires motions of the Prime Minister, government or competent minister. A significant part of reservations connected with the manner of determination of international legal competences of the head of state is embodied in regulations related to the defense.
Evaluation of relations between entities of executive power should be started with indication of the entity which is legally privileged. In article 146 section 1 of the Constitution it is resolved in a clear manner by attribution of internal and foreign policy leading to the government.
In turn, from article 146 section 4 of the Constitution there result specific solutions as to competences, emphasizing systemic domination of the government. It pertains also to ensuring internal security of the state and public order, as well as performance of general leadership within the scope of relations with other states and international organizations.
It is hard to propose specific changes within the scope of shape as to organization and competences of executive power without indication of the system preferred by the legislator -whether it is presidential or parliamentary cabinet system. It is important for the manner of regulation in the Constitution to exclude or at least minimize possible conflicts between the President and the government. Nevertheless, it is worth serious consideration whether, facing tensions in foreign policy, choice of the presidential system, fostering, as it should be deemed, effective increase of strength of the state, does not constitute a more reasonable option. Prejudices claiming that such solution puts democratic order, including the sphere of rights and freedoms of individuals, in jeopardy, are not justified, as a strong, properly organized and stable state constitutes a systemic guarantee and fosters the possibility of full exercise of rights and freedoms.
Functioning of entities of the judiciary, i.e. courts and tribunals, is based on two basic criteria, i.e. independence ('niezależność') in the sphere of rulings and independence ('niezawisłość') of judges. The independence ('niezależność') means impossibility to interfere in the process of issuance of rulings and concerns primarily courts, whereas independence ('niezawisłość') of judges is a possibility to issue rulings in accordance with oneself 's convictions, but on the basis of binding law and evidence findings. Courts as the only ones are vested with judicial authority (article 175 section 1 of the Constitution), which means resolution of legal disputes.
That sphere of activity of courts constitutes embodiment of exercise of universal right to a fair trial (article 45 section 1 of the Constitution) 15 . It means that everyone is vested with the right to fair and open consideration of a case by the court, which should take place without unjustified default. The criteria indicated by the Constitution for a court is competence, independence ('niezależność'), impartiality, independence ('niezawisłość'). The last category may evoke astonishment as in other constitutional provisions (for instance article 186 section 1 of the Constitution), as well as statutory norms, independence ('niezależność') of courts and independence ('niezawisłość') of judges is consequently indicated. It is, however, the manner of legislation (article 45 section 1 of the Constitution) constituting an example of some semantic carelessness which is blameworthy taking into consideration the place of the Basic Law in the system of sources of law. Also, specific elements of the right to a fair trial should not only be extended in subconstitutional acts, but also be practically implemented. Lengthiness of proceedings before Polish courts is commonly known and quite often generates dramatic consequences for the parties in proceedings.
In the Constitution, a wide array of norms that are to constitute guarantees of independence ('niezawisłość') of judges (articles 178-181 of the Constitution) may be found. At least part of them, such as immunity, are far too excessive, minimizing the possibility of responsibility of judges in unjustified manner. It should be underlined that the independence ('niezawisłość') of judges may not lead to a feeling of independence from law, due to constitutionally determined (article 178 section 1 of the Constitution) submission of judges to the Constitution and statutes.
By giving rulings in individual cases, judges resolve matters according to their convictions but taking into account factual and legal state, which was already underlined while referring to the notion of independence ('niezawisłość'). The independence ('niezależność') of courts in issuance of rulings should not be construed broadly and lead to actual emancipation, by the judiciary, with regard to bodies of other powers. Thus, it is worthy to invoke and regulate such issues unequivocally in case of amendments of the Constitution, for instance by introducing abrogation or significant limitation of immunity of judges or a new shape of disciplinary proceedings.
As a side note to the considerations made, it seems sensible to make the same proposal concerning the immunity also in case of members of the Seym and the Senate (article 105 of the Constitution).
Different issue as to quality is the aforementioned, in the context of article 45 section 1 of the Constitution, the matter of linguistic vices appearing in the Basic Law. They are relatively numerous and have various nature and possible ramifications, therefore, chosen examples deserve to be indicated.
The principle of sovereignty (independence) of the Republic of Poland is derived from the Constitution on the basis of an array of already determined cases of regulations within the framework of which such notions are used. It cause the doctrine even to adopt a rule of sovereignty and independence despite semantic balance of these categories, which probably took place as a result of a conviction that such differentiation is based on a deeper thought. However, a comparison of contents of article 126 section 2 and article 130 of the Constitution suggests rather randomness and the fact of interchangeable use of these notions. Namely, in the first of invoked provisions, comprising elements of systemic placement of the President, the following phrase is used: '…is a guardian of sovereignty and security of the state…'. In article 130 of the Constitution, comprising the substance of the presidential oath there is found the statement that the President will guard '…independence and security of the state…' Therefore, while invoking the element of security, it is juxtaposed, by use of a conjunction 'and' respectively with 'sovereignty' and 'independence' of the state. It may be deemed that the issue is insignificant; however, it concerns the legal act of a higher rank, which as a rule is directly applicable, where linguistic standards, as already pointed out, should be particularly high.
Other situation which is linguistically dubious, refers to article 2 and article 45 section 1 of the Constitution. Both the aforementioned provisions have already been invoked, and when determining the rule of democratic legal state (article 2 of the Constitution) there are also shown the obligations for Polish state to implement '…the rule of social fairness'. One of elements of the right to a trial (article 45 section 1 of the Constitution) remains fair consideration of the case. Therefore, it should be assessed whether fairness and social fairness are tantamount to each other or rather deliberately differentiated in the Constitution? Fairness, relatively commonly perceived in subjective manner, constitutes mainly philosophical category, although it also takes normative dimension. An attempt of objectivization of that notion at the level of passing rulings consists in adoption of legal and evidentiary criteria as the criteria constituting the exclusive basis of court rulings. Social fairness should be probably recognized as a category of ideological character, politically conditioned, although in case of the Constitution being the element of the legal norm.
However, that duality as to notions introduces unnecessary terminological confusion, even more unnecessary when we realize that in the Basic Law there is set forth the principle of equality with regard to the law 16 and the ban on discrimination, resulting therefrom (article 32 of the Constitution ). No values will therefore be put in danger by an assessment (including legal assessment) solely in categories of fairness or lack of fairness.
While evaluating chosen constitutional regulations, deficiencies were indicated at three levels. First of them is lack of unequivocal determination of place of the Constitution in the system of sources of binding law in Poland. The second one pertains to the manner of organization and functioning of bodies of legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The third one refers to the need of observance of high standards (including linguistic ones) in the legislative process.
Putting in order inter alia these spheres should influence efficiency of functioning of public power bodies, and consequently have a positive impact on the situation within the scope of rights and freedoms of individuals. The area within which the necessity of introduction of changes exists is wide, thus, their performance is difficult but viable.
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